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Abstract: The central notion of the natural trading partner hypothesis is that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) will be 
welfare enhancing for members if there is a strong level of bilateral trade complementarity among their trade 
structures. This paper presents an empirical examination of this issue with reference to a small developing trade 
bloc–the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and its trading partners. The trade intensity index model is used to 
assess the determinants of intra-CARICOM and extra-CARICOM trade, placing focus on trade complementarity. 
The results showed that intra-CARICOM trade complementarity is low and concentrated in a few primary industries 
which can provide a possible explanation for the persistent low levels of intra-CARICOM trade. The findings also 
indicate that trade complementarity is generally low between CARICOM countries and their proposed FTA partners 
in the European Union (EU) and North America. The best natural trading partners for CARICOM countries are then 
identified based on a ranking of countries from 7 regions (CARICOM, the EU, North America, Asia, Central 
America, Latin America and Africa).  
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1. Introduction  
 
The success of trade agreements in promoting trade is most feasible in an environment where 
countries or prospective countries of a FTA are endowed with comparative advantage in diverse 
products or strong trade complementarities (see Schiff 2001, Kemal 2003, Trebilcock and Howse 
2005, Feaver and Wilson 2005, Yang and Gupta 2005 and Hapsari and Mangunsong 2006). In 
fact, the natural trading partner hypothesis identifies those characteristics –trade 
complementarity, geographic proximity and high initial trade volumes– that countries should 
share prior to the formation of a FTA in order to foster greater economic outcomes.  
 
Despite almost 4 decades of regional integration initiatives, the low levels of intra-CARICOM 
trade have been a major concern for trade policy makers in the region (see Table 1).
3
 Intra-
CARICOM trade amounted to 8.54 per cent of CARICOM’s total trade in 1973 and took 
approximately four (4) decades to double in size. Although a simultaneous decline in extra-
regional exports is recorded, CARICOM countries’ exports to the extra-regional market accounts 
for over 86 per cent of CARICOM’s total exports in 2010. Many scholars in the CARICOM 
region raised queries about the rationale for economic integration among Caribbean countries in 
relation to its potential to improve intra-regional trade. Farrell (2001, 11-12) noted that “our 
basic motivation (for integration) is not economic at all … I believe that subconsciously we 
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 The CARICOM trade agreement was established in 1973 and includes the following countries: Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Trinidad and 
Tobago, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname.        
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chose our partners first and then … began to worry consciously about the economics of the 
relationship.”4  
 
Table 1: The share of CARICOM countries trade (%) 
  CARICOM Canada EU USA ROW 
1973 8.54 4.56 25.08 33.99 27.83 
1975 4.59 2.89 13.83 63.84 14.86 
1980 5.02 1.28 20.24 57.16 16.30 
1985 5.38 2.66 15.11 64.34 12.51 
1990 7.24 4.36 25.48 38.69 24.23 
1995 10.73 4.79 22.28 32.76 29.44 
2001 16.12 5.81 20.26 37.59 20.21 
2002 14.11 5.63 21.15 39.61 19.51 
2003 11.96 5.13 16.8 50.56 15.54 
2004 11.78 4.78 15.73 53.16 14.54 
2005 11.84 4.26 16.66 52.71 14.53 
2006 11.05 4.16 20.49 48.25 16.04 
2007 12.48 4.88 15.77 46.62 20.25 
2008 12.47 3.77 21.59 38.66 23.51 
2009 13.08 4.74 21.28 38.05 22.85 
2010 13.91 5.51 14.64 37.71 28.22 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2013). 
 
The integration efforts among Caribbean countries have been largely centered on market driven 
integration. CARICOM was initially intended to be an intra-regional free trade area with the 
implementation of a common external tariff. However, Wint (2005, 138) noted that CARICOM 
as a FTA is “doomed to be a low impact activity.” Wint (2005, 137) suggested that a major 
obstacle to increasing intra-CARICOM trade is the “lack of trade complementarity among 
CARICOM economies.” Worrell (1994, 435-436) supported this notion by arguing that “…there 
are few complementarities that would make for intra-regional trade (in CARICOM), and efforts 
to develop them have not been successful.”5  
                                                          
4
 Farrell (2001) also noted that Caribbean economies are not in a position to capitalize on the benefits that a larger 
regional market can offer small developing countries as their production structures are not sufficiently developed. 
Farrell suggested that resource-production integration is more feasible for the Caribbean region. 
5
 Morgan (1962) also supported this view insofar that countries in the West Indies are essentially primary producers 
and tariff reductions will not lead to any significant increases in the volume or composition of trade. 
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These views are ‘unsubstantiated’ as the level of trade complementarity among CARICOM 
countries is yet to be fully evaluated from an empirical standpoint. This paper fills this empirical 
gap by using a trade intensity index model to determine the level and dynamics of trade 
complementarity at the industry and country level for CARICOM countries. A detailed empirical 
assessment of trade complementarity in the extra-regional market is policy relevant at this time 
as CARICOM countries are negotiating full FTAs with their former preference donors in North-
America and the EU.
6
 Given the CARICOM region’s persistent low levels of intra-regional trade 
and their active extra-regional trade agenda in the coming years, it is imperative that a rigorous 
empirical analysis on the dynamics of trade complementarity for CARICOM member’s be 
undertaken. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the natural 
trading partner hypothesis in relation to FTAs. Section 2 reviews the natural trading partner 
hypothesis. Section 3 outlines a measure for trade complementarity. Section 4 discusses the data 
used in the trade intensity index model. Section 5 provides the results from the model for 
CARICOM and non-CARICOM countries. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The “Natural Trading Partner” Hypothesis  
 
The natural trading partner hypothesis and the notion that FTAs among natural trading partners is 
more likely to improve their economic welfare were introduced by Wonnacott and Lutz (1989). 
The literature identifies several measures for determining a country’s natural trading partner. 
Prominent among them are the initial volume of trade, geographic proximity and trade 
complementarity.  
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 These agreements include the Lome Convention, Caribbean Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN) and the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) with the EU, Canada and the United States of America (USA), respectively.  
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Initial Volume of Trade  
 
The notion that a high initial volume of trade between prospective members of a FTA will 
increase welfare was introduced by Lipsey (1960). Lipsey (1960, 507-8) asserted that “... the 
larger are purchases of domestic commodities and the smaller are purchases from the outside 
world, the more likely it is that the union will bring gain.” Wonnacott and Lutz (1989, 69) argued 
that if the prospective members of a FTA are initially important trading partners then the 
formation of a FTA among them “… will be reinforcing natural trading partners, not artificially 
diverting them.” Summers (1991, 3) supporting the initial volume of trade criterion argued that if 
“blocs are created between countries that already trade disproportionately; the risk of large 
amounts of trade diversion is reduced.” Park (1995) also suggested that if the share of intra-
regional trade in total trade is small then this would increase the possibility that trade blocs 
would result in trade diversion.  
 
Geography 
  
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) identified geographic proximity as another important criterion to 
identify a natural trading partner. Krugman (1993) noted that there is a strong tendency for 
countries in geographic proximity to trade more with each other because of the benefits from low 
transportation and communication costs. Indeed, Deardorff and Stern (1994) asserted that if 
countries are located close to each other, then the formation of a FTA can increase their 
economic welfare as there are benefits to be derived from lower transaction costs. Krugman 
(1991, 1993) considered economic geography; transportation cost in particular, to show that the 
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success of FTAs depend on the geographic proximity of trading partners. The underlying 
principle of Krugman’s notion is that in the case where inter-continental transport cost is zero; 
the creation of continental FTAs is likely to reduce economic welfare. On the other hand, when 
inter-continental transport cost is infinite, continental FTAs are likely to be welfare improving 
(see Frankel, Stein and Wei 1996 for an extension of this model).7 This notion was strongly 
refuted by Panagariya (1999, 16) using the following example:
8
  
 
Suppose the world consists of two continents, two countries per continent, and two goods produced at 
constant but different labour costs a la Ricardo. Suppose further that the countries located on the same 
continent are identical in all respects but differ across continents. Despite positive transport costs across 
continents but none within a continent, there are no gains from forming continental blocs whereas, with 
sufficiently large comparative cost differences across continents, gains are available to blocs between 
countries across continents.  
 
Furthermore, Bhagwati (1993) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) comprehensively critiqued 
both criteria (initial volume of trade and geographic proximity) for defining a natural trading 
partner.9 Empirical evidence refuting the natural trading partner hypothesis on the basis of a high 
initial volume of trade and geographic proximity was first provided by Krishna (2003) and then 
Magee (2004). Krishna (2003) examined trade between the USA and 24 of its trading partners 
and found that changes in welfare were uncorrelated with both the initial volume of trade and 
geographic distance (see also Magee 2004, Lee and Park 2006 and Yener 2008 for similar 
results).  
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 The underlying assumptions of geographic proximity as proposed by these authors are that the countries are 
identical and are characterized by a one factor one industry model in an environment of zero intra-continental 
transport cost (Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero and Martínez-Serrano 2012).  
8
 See also (Lawrence 1996, Krueger 1999, Nadav and Kleiman 2008). 
9
 See Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) for a systematic critique of the volume of trade and the geographic criteria. 
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Trade Complementarity 
 
The shortcomings associated with the natural trading partner hypothesis formulated in reference 
to geography and initial volume of trade paved the way for Schiff (2001) to redefine the natural 
trading partner hypothesis in terms of trade complementarity. Schiff (2001) asserted that trading 
partners are natural if their trading structure is characterised by complementarity.
10
  
 
Schiff (2001) developed a theoretical model to establish that a FTA between countries with 
strong and improving complementary trade structures is more likely to be welfare enhancing. In 
this regard, trade complementarity appears to be a strong measure for defining a country’s real 
natural trade partner.
11
 The nitty-gritty of this argument has to do with the export capacity of the 
exporting country being large enough to fulfill the import demand of the importing country 
competitively. The importing country’s market now becomes the natural trade market for the 
exporting country as the exporting country’s trade can survive in a highly competitive 
environment in that market. Likewise the importing country would be importing from the most 
efficient supplier thus avoiding possible trade diversion. 
 
The fundamental condition here is for the exporting country to have comparative advantage in its 
export trade to the relevant importing country implying that the importing country should have a 
comparative disadvantage in similar trade owing to inter alia some sub-optimal production 
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 Shakur and Ness (2011) assess the level of trade complementarity between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand 
Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) and determined that New Zealand and ASEAN5 are moderate natural trading partners 
based on a trade complementarity index. See also Pitigala (2005) for similar study on South Asian countries. 
11
 This does not mean that trade complementarity is mutually exclusive to geographic closeness or high initial 
volume of trade but that the welfare gains from creating free trade agreements would arise largely from strong trade 
complementarity.  
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technique vis-a-vis the exporting country and the world. This means that the natural trading 
partner hypothesis pairs countries with diverse comparative advantage structures. This type of 
trading environment is largely trade creating  and results in efficiency gains from comparative 
cost differential which in turn guarantees an optimal economic welfare outcome for the creation 
of FTAs. The trade complementarity criterion is superior to the geography and volume of trade 
criteria as it is based on the comparative advantage structure of trading partners (similar to 
arguments presented by Panagaria (1999)). The trade complementarity criterion is also consistent 
with traditional theories of international trade such as the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin 
theories, unlike previous criteria of the natural trading partner hypothesis. Trade 
complementarity is important for defining a natural trading partner as it facilitates the efficient 
use of resources which is essential for small developing countries in a rapidly globalizing world 
economy. There are several studies that concur with the need for trade complementarity among 
members or prospective members of a FTA (see Kemal 2003, Trebilcock and Howse 2005, 
Feaver and Wilson 2005, Yang and Gupta 2005 and Hapsari and Mangunsong 2006). 
 
3. Measuring Trade Complementarity: Trade Intensity Index Model 
 
An apt measure to determine the level of trade complementarity between two countries can be 
obtained by examining the comparative advantage (disadvantage) structures of the relevant 
countries.
12
 Drysdale (1967) introduced a trade intensity index model to assess the intensity of 
trade between an exporting country and its import partners. According to Drysdale, the intensity 
of bilateral trade between two countries can be assessed by a trade intensity index which takes 
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 This comparison would determine whether there is significant complementarity between the relevant countries to 
boost trade outcomes. 
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into account all factors influencing bilateral trade between two countries. However, Drysdale and 
Garnaut (1982, 68) noted that a major limitation associated with the value of the trade intensity 
index in its aggregated form is that, “it fails to make allowance for the varying commodity 
composition of countries’ foreign trade. Where commodities are not substitutable for each other, 
opportunities for bilateral trade are limited by the degree of complementarity in the commodity 
composition of one country’s exports and the other’s imports.” The trade intensity index can be 
separated into a trade complementarity index which measures the traditional trade determining 
factors (comparative advantage) and the trade bias index which accounts for all the other factors 
influencing trade (see Drysdale 1967 and Yamazawa 1970). The trade intensity index (Iij) can be 
shown as the product of a trade complementarity index (Cij) and a trade bias index (Bij).
13  
 
ijijij BCI                                                                                                                                   (1) 
 
The trade intensity index for country i’s trade with country j takes the following form: 
 
iw
j
i
ij
ij
MM
M
X
X
I

 /                                                                                                                       (2) 
 
Where: Xij – country i exports to country j, 
Xi – country i total exports, 
Mj – country j total imports, 
Mi – country i total imports, 
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 See Drysdale (1967), Drysdale and Garnaut (1982) and Yamazawa (1970) for a comprehensive review of the 
decomposition and application of trade intensity index.  
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Mw – world imports. 
 
The trade intensity index has a theoretical range from a value greater than zero to less than 
infinity. The trade intensity index measures country i’s exports to country j as a share in its total 
exports in relation to country j’s imports from the world as a share in world imports. The 
structure of the trade intensity index means that trade between country i and country j is 
becoming more intensive when the trade intensity index takes on a value greater than one (1) 
while the opposite holds when the value of the trade intensity index takes on a value less than 
one (1). The term Xij refers to actual trade between country i and country j which is influenced 
by several factors including comparative advantage structures and other non-traditional trade 
determining factors. To measure trade complementarity in the context of the natural trading 
partner hypothesis one would need to remove the non-traditional trade determining factors from 
equation (2). This modification can be done by introducing ijX  which represents the expected 
value of trade between country i and country j on the basis of their comparative advantage (see 
Drysdale 1967). This situation implies that if country i is a relatively large (small) exporter of 
commodity k in the world then country j is more likely (less likely) to import k from country i in 
relation to world trade in commodity k.
14
  Expected trade between i and j is then formulated as: 
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Where: k
iX  – country i exports of commodity k, 
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 This is based on the assumption that k is a homogenous product for which there is negligible transport costs and 
trade impediments in its trade between country i and country j (Yamazawa 1970).  
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k
jM  – country j imports of commodity k, 
k
wM  – world imports of commodity k,  
k
iM  – country i imports of commodity k. 
 
Summing across the expected value of all k commodities, yields the expected value of total 
exports of country i going to country j as: 
   

k
k
ijij XX                                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
Substituting the expected value of trade  ijX  for the actual trade  ijX  in the trade intensity index 
yields the trade complementarity index as:  
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The trade complementarity index for a product k for an exporting country i and an importing 
country j is determined by the weighted sum of country i’s comparative advantage in commodity 
k and country j’s comparative disadvantage in commodity k.15 The export specialization for 
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 The weight accounts for all other supply sources of commodity k. If other supply sources (the world supply 
excluding country i) have a comparative advantage in exporting commodity k relative to country i, then 
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country i has the form of the Balassa’s revealed comparative advantage index and country j’s 
import specialization also takes on a similar structure.
16
 The trade complementarity index has a 
theoretical range from a value greater than zero to a value less than infinity. A value of the trade 
complementarity index greater than one (1) indicates that there is trade complementarity between 
country i and country j. The other influences affecting the intensity of trade between country i 
and country j is captured by a special country bias index. The trade bias index takes into account 
factors such as language differences, tastes and preferences, policy of the trading partner, 
transport cost and product differentiation (Yamazawa 1970). It is obtained as follows:   
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Where ijX  and ijX  represent actual and expected trade, respectively. Substituting for 

k
k
ijij XX  and simplifying yields: 
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 Assuming that world exports is equal to world imports and world exports to country j is equal to country j import 
from the world then we can formulate country i’s comparative advantage and j’s comparative disadvantage index 
(RCD) for a homogeneous commodity k according to Balassa (1965) as follows: 
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The trade bias index also has a theoretical range from a value greater than zero to a value less 
than infinity. If bilateral trade between i and j is determined only by traditional trade determining 
factors then the trade bias index takes on a value of one (1). In this context, the level of special 
country bias is defined as the divergence between the expected value of trade and the actual 
value of trade. A value of the trade bias index greater than one (1) indicates that country i has a 
special country bias towards country j.
17
  
 
4. Data  
 
The dataset used to calculate the various trade indices for CARICOM countries is constructed 
from the United Nations Commercial Trade Database. The computation of the trade indices 
require that the commodity (k) be homogeneous across countries and in this regard the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) 3-digit level trade data is used (see Anderson 1983, 
Greenaway and Milner 1986, Menon 1996 and Elliott and Ikemoto 2004). The analysis covers a 
period of 10 years from 2001–2010 and the most updated trade statistics for this period is 
obtained from SITC revision 3 of the United Nations Commercial Trade Database. The bilateral 
trade complementarity index is calculated for each 264 SITC 3 digit commodities for a total of 
852 bilateral trade relationships involving CARICOM countries.  Bilateral trade data is required 
for the calculation of the trade intensity index and the trade bias index. However, some 
CARICOM countries do not trade with many non-CARICOM countries which limit the 
calculations using the two indices. The countries that were examined are 12 members of the 
CARICOM region and 60 non-CARICOM countries (see Table 2). The non-CARICOM 
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 Studies that previously used the trade intensity approach include Drysdale (1967), Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), 
Yamazawa (1970), Anderson (1983), Hill (1985), Anderson and Garnaut (1985), Thornton (1987), Sarmad and 
Mahmood (1988), Aggarawal and Pandey (1992), Chow et al (1999), Vollrath and Johnston (2001), Vollrath (2003), 
Osimani (2005), Pitigala (2005), Ramayandi (2005), Drysdale and Xu (2004), Kim (2007), Weldemicael (2010), 
Tash et al (2012) and Kim (2012). 
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countries are chosen from trade blocs such as the EU, Latin America, North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Central America, Asia and some African countries.     
 
Table 2: List of countries and their country codes 
Country name country code Country name country code 
CARICOM countries
18
 NAFTA 
Bahamas BHS Canada CAN 
Barbados BRB Mexico MEX 
Belize BLZ United States of America USA 
Dominica DMA Latin American Countries
19
 
Grenada GRD Argentina ARG 
Guyana GUY Bolivia BOL 
Jamaica JAM Brazil BRA 
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA Colombia COL 
Saint Lucia LCA Ecuador ECU 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines VCT Paraguay PRY 
Suriname SUR Peru PER 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO Uruguay URY 
European Union (25) Central American countries  
Austria AUT Costa Rica CRI 
Belgium BEL El Salvador SLV 
Cyprus CYP Guatemala GTM 
Czech Republic CZE Honduras HND 
Denmark DNK Asia 
Estonia EST China CHN 
Finland FIN India IND 
France FRA Indonesia IDN 
Germany DEU Japan JPN 
Greece GRC Pakistan PAK 
Hungary HUN Philippines PHL 
Ireland IRL Singapore SGP 
Italy ITA Thailand THA 
Latvia LVA Other countries  
Lithuania LTU Algeria DZA 
Luxembourg LUX Australia AUS 
Malta MLT Belarus  BLR 
Netherlands NLD Bulgaria BGR 
Poland POL Côte d'Ivoire CIV 
Portugal PRT Croatia HRV 
Slovakia SVK Egypt EGY 
Slovenia SVN Iceland ISL 
Spain ESP Israel ISR 
Sweden SWE New Zealand NZL 
United Kingdom GBR Russian Federation RUS 
    Turkey TUR 
 
                                                          
18
 The members of the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) are Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and Grenadines while the Most Developed Countries (MDCs) in the CARICOM 
are Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, The Bahamas, Barbados and Belize. 
19
 MERCOSUR includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.    
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5. Results   
 
This section will firstly examine the results from the trade intensity index model to determine the 
top natural trading partners for the CARICOM region. The natural trading partner for the 
CARICOM region is determined by the highest value of the bilateral trade complementarity 
index. Specifically, the analysis identifies the best “natural” trading partners for CARICOM as a 
trade bloc to several trade blocs and for each CARICOM member to individual countries using 
data for the period 2001-2010. Then an examination of intra-CARICOM and extra-CARICOM 
trade complementarity is undertaken at the country and industry level. The results from the trade 
intensity index and trade bias index are then compared to the results from the trade 
complementarity index.   
 
5.1 Who are CARICOM member’s Top “Natural Trading Partners”? 
 
The results from the trade complementarity index shows that the top natural trade blocs for the 
CARICOM region are Central America, MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) and Asia. 
At the bloc level, the CARICOM reveals the highest level of trade complementarity with Central 
America, recording a trade complementarity index value of 1.33, followed by MERCOSUR and 
Asia with a trade complementarity index value of 1.18 and 1.17, respectively. It is important to 
note that neither the EU nor NAFTA (CARICOM major export markets) reveals an index value 
above one (1). Also interesting is that trade complementarity between CARICOM countries and 
BRICs is above one (1), (see Figure 1).
20
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 BRIC is a group of emerging economies which includes Brazil, Russia, India and China.  
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Figure 1: CARICOM’s Top Natural Trading Partners (2001-2010).  
 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012).  
 
Disaggregating the CARICOM region into two subgroups can provide further information to 
determine whether the natural trade blocs for the small countries are the same for the larger 
countries in the region.
 
Figure 2 shows the trade complementarity index for the OECS group of 
countries. The results indicate that Central America, Latin America, Canada and the EU are the 
top natural trading partners for the OECS. Specifically, the trade complementarity index between 
the OECS and Central America averaged 1.56 for the period 2001-2010. Although CARICOM 
revealed a trade complementarity index over one (1) with MERCOSUR, Asia and BRICs, these 
countries are not natural trading partners for the OECS bloc as the value of their bilateral trade 
complementarity index remained below one (1).   
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Figure 2: OECS Top Natural Trading Partners (2001-2010)      
 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
 
Furthermore, an examination of the natural trade blocs for the MDCs in the CARICOM region 
revealed some interesting insights. In the first instance, Central America emerged as the best 
natural trade bloc for the MDCs in the CARICOM region. However, unlike the OECS, the value 
of the bilateral trade complementarity index between the MDCs and the EU is below one (1). 
More importantly is that Asia, BRICs and MERCOSUR emerged as being among the best 
natural trade blocs for the MDCs when compared to the OECS (Figure 3).   
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Figure 3: MDCs Top Natural Trading Partners (2001-2010). 
 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
 
The best natural trading partners for each CARICOM member is then determined by ranking the 
trade complementarity index for each CARICOM country in relation to 71 of the selected trading 
partners from the sample. The countries (ten) that reveal the highest level of trade 
complementarity with each CARICOM member is then defined as their “natural” trading 
partners (see Table 3). Some general observations can be made from the information in Table 3. 
In the first instance, the natural trading partners for Barbados, Belize, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada are CARICOM countries. On the other hand, the 
natural trading partners for Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, The Bahamas, 
and St. Kitts and Nevis were primarily dominated by non-CARICOM countries. It should be 
noted that several EU countries were also featured in some of CARICOM’s list of top natural 
trading partners (Bahamas, Jamaica, and St. Kitts and Nevis). However, Canada only appeared in 
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
0.89 0.90 0.92 
0.96 
1.04 1.07 
1.11 1.12 
1.32 
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the top 10 natural trading partners of Jamaica. The USA did not feature in the list of top ten 
natural trading partners for the listed CARICOM members.  
 
Table 3: CARICOM member’s “natural” trading partners (2001-2010)  
 
BHS 
 
BLZ 
 
BRB 
 
DMA 
 
GRD 
 
GUY 
ISL 2.63 LCA 2.14 DMA 3.90 BRB 3.09 DMA 12.18 ISL 8.32 
GUY 1.84 RUS 2.11 LCA 3.79 LCA 2.99 BOL 11.90 CIV 6.82 
ESP 1.59 JAM 1.98 VCT 3.71 VCT 2.99 LCA 8.76 IND 4.04 
HND 1.49 VCT 1.92 GRD 3.53 BHS 2.94 SUR 5.80 VCT 3.33 
CHN 1.43 BHS 1.91 KNA 3.18 KNA 2.86 KNA 5.20 RUS 2.71 
PRY 1.41 BRB 1.90 GUY 3.03 GUY 2.81 CIV 4.72 JAM 2.45 
JAM 1.40 GRD 1.89 BHS 2.90 BOL 2.66 BHS 2.85 DZA 2.42 
CYP 1.40 DZA 1.87 BLZ 2.84 GRD 2.64 GUY 2.52 GRD 2.35 
IDN 1.38 KNA 1.85 JAM 2.53 SLV 2.61 IDN 2.44 DMA 2.22 
MLT 1.38 ISL 1.70 SUR 2.45 HND 2.36 BRB 2.13 ISR 2.21 
  JAM   KNA   LCA   SUR   TTO   VCT 
ISL 30.66 DZA 2.14 BHS 2.50 CIV 1.07 GUY 2.83 DMA 12.70 
RUS 7.23 MEX 2.03 BRB 2.41 VCT 0.60 JAM 2.80 BOL 12.09 
EGY 5.37 HUN 1.93 KNA 2.27 JAM 0.52 HND 2.29 LCA 10.13 
NZL 4.51 GRD 1.91 DMA 2.21 GUY 0.49 BHS 2.14 CIV 7.97 
ARG 3.63 RUS 1.84 GUY 2.14 BHS 0.48 BLR 2.10 KNA 5.70 
SVN 3.22 VCT 1.75 RUS 2.00 DMA 0.45 PAK 2.06 SUR 5.64 
CAN 2.41 EST 1.71 LVA 1.99 LCA 0.45 IDN 2.02 BHS 3.52 
IDN 2.10 DMA 1.66 HND 1.86 HND 0.44 SUR 1.94 IDN 2.86 
CHN 1.93 BRB 1.57 VCT 1.84 GRD 0.38 PRY 1.91 BRB 2.69 
SVK 1.84 CZE 1.54 BLZ 1.83 CYP 0.34 DMA 1.85 GUY 2.60 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
 
5.2 Intra-CARICOM Trade Complementarity  
 
The results from the trade complementarity indices for CARICOM countries are reported in 
Table 4. The majority of the bilateral trade complementarity indices are above one (1) indicating 
the presence of complementary trade structures among CARICOM countries for the most part. In 
fact, the strongest level of trade complementarity is observed for Grenada and Dominica where 
the value of their bilateral trade complementarity index is 14.77 for the period 2006-2010. 
Another interesting observation is that the level of trade complementarity among members of the 
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Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is larger when compared to other larger 
CARICOM countries. 
 
The inter-temporal changes for trade complementarity among CARICOM countries reveal that 
approximately 53 per cent of the 132 bilateral combinations (12*11) reported an improvement 
from 2001-2005 to 2006-2010. On one extreme, countries such as Jamaica and St. Lucia have 
reported improvements in their structure of trade complementarity with all their CARICOM 
counter-parts while on the other extreme, it declined for Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados with 
all their listed CARICOM counterparts. Grenada’s trade complementarity also improved with 10 
CARICOM members but declined relative to Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, some members 
of the CARICOM region that began the period (2001-2005) with no trade complementarity in 
relation to their CARICOM counterparts, experienced improvements by the period 2006-2010. 
For example, Jamaica observed an improvement of the trade complementarity index from below 
one (1) to above one (1) with The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada and Guyana.  
 
Table 4: Trade complementarity indices for CARICOM countries (2001-2005 to 2006-2010) 
  B
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S
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BHS 
 
1.74 3.24 2.94 2.56 1.37 0.95 1.22 2.44 0.37 2.46 3.39 
 
2.07 2.56 2.95 3.33 1.41 1.63 1.09 2.61 0.60 1.82 3.65 
BLZ 
1.09 
 
3.03 1.98 1.21 0.37 0.57 0.61 1.62 0.26 2.09 0.93 
1.33 
 
2.65 1.90 1.20 0.48 1.17 0.80 2.19 0.40 1.61 1.05 
BRB 
1.29 1.71 
 
2.98 1.96 1.88 1.02 1.69 2.19 0.31 1.85 2.36 
1.11 2.09 
 
3.19 2.42 2.26 1.31 1.39 2.79 0.35 1.18 3.01 
DMA 
1.14 1.53 4.50 
 
10.63 2.25 1.10 1.85 2.07 0.38 2.11 12.36 
1.44 1.49 3.30 
 
14.77 2.20 1.57 1.34 2.43 0.52 1.59 13.03 
GRD 
1.02 1.79 3.65 2.56 
 
2.26 0.87 2.25 1.59 0.33 1.59 2.28 
1.04 2.02 3.37 2.75 
 
2.46 1.29 1.35 1.89 0.44 1.26 2.64 
GUY 
1.66 0.95 3.54 2.88 1.76 
 
0.81 1.19 2.08 0.34 3.37 1.28 
2.03 0.90 2.53 2.74 3.79 
 
1.74 1.16 2.25 0.64 2.30 3.92 
JAM 
1.17 1.78 2.85 1.88 1.72 2.36 
 
1.55 1.60 0.42 2.93 1.98 
1.63 2.18 2.20 1.88 1.64 2.55 
 
0.94 1.65 0.61 2.66 2.30 
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KNA 
1.09 1.61 3.18 2.82 4.31 1.38 0.75 
 
1.88 0.29 1.48 5.63 
0.68 2.25 3.18 2.93 6.69 1.72 0.86 
 
2.92 0.28 0.83 5.83 
LCA 
1.64 2.17 3.99 3.11 7.68 2.05 1.06 1.58 
 
0.40 1.94 10.68 
1.05 2.10 3.46 2.79 10.55 1.96 1.44 1.21 
 
0.53 1.69 9.22 
SUR 
1.13 1.25 2.80 1.33 4.06 1.38 0.74 1.42 1.52 
 
2.16 4.74 
1.37 1.08 2.11 1.28 8.69 1.47 2.21 0.76 1.65 
 
1.73 6.54 
TTO 
0.74 1.06 1.44 1.08 1.58 1.15 0.50 0.91 0.90 0.18 
 
2.12 
0.63 2.28 1.27 1.31 1.20 1.09 0.69 0.73 0.83 0.14 
 
1.48 
VCT 
1.03 2.04 4.07 3.02 1.70 3.18 0.99 2.05 1.63 0.54 1.70   
1.47 1.81 3.35 2.96 2.27 3.48 1.54 1.24 2.18 0.65 1.49   
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012).  
Note: Exporting countries listed in columns. 
 
5.3 Product Complementarity for Intra-CARICOM Trade 
 
It should be noted that a relatively large value of the trade complementarity index does not 
necessarily mean that the trading partners have complementarity in a wide range of commodities. 
Thus, it is important to examine trade complementarity at the industry level. Further analysis into 
the composition of product trade complementarity among CARICOM countries reveals that trade 
complementarity originates from a few primary product groups.  
  
The Bahamas observed complementarity in petroleum products (SITC 334) with St. Lucia, 
Jamaica and Guyana. Indeed, complementarity in petroleum products (SITC 334) between The 
Bahamas and the latter two countries has improved in the last decade (Table 5). Product 
complementarity for Belize exists in sugar, molasses and honey (SITC 061), petroleum, oils and 
crude (SITC 333) and fruit and vegetable juices (SITC 059) with 4 CARICOM members. 
Trinidad and Tobago began the decade with complementarity in petroleum products with 8 of its 
CARICOM counterparts but this declined to 6 in the latter part of the decade. Guyana’s 
complementarity is dominated by rice (SITC 042) and sugar, molasses and honey (SITC 061). 
Products such as soap, cleaners and polish (SITC 554) are the only products that Dominica has 
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revealed and maintained complementarity in with 9 members of the CARICOM region, although 
in some instances it has declined over time. St. Vincent and the Grenadines reported 
complementarity in meal, flour of wheat (SITC 046) for the period 2001-2010. Complementarity 
for St. Kitts and Nevis is observed in the product group (SITC 061) but this product group 
declined to below one (1) by the end of the period.  
 
Overall, the structure intra-CARICOM trade complementarity is explained by a total of 6 
commodity groups at the SITC 3 digit level, the majority of which are primary and natural 
resource intensive in nature. The empirical evidence suggests that there has been no significant 
dynamism in the growth or expansion of intra-CARICOM trade complementarity in new product 
areas over the last decade.   
 
Table 5: Product complementarity for intra-CARICOM trade  
(Cij>1 for either 2001-2005 to 2006-2010) 
CARICOM Partner Description SITC 01-05 06-10 ∆ 
BHS LCA Petroleum products  334 0.50 1.05 + 
BHS JAM Petroleum products  334 0.67 1.19 + 
BHS GUY Petroleum products  334 1.47 1.53 + 
BLZ VCT Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.10 0.80 - 
BLZ LCA Fruit, vegetable juices 059 0.96 1.18 + 
BLZ KNA Fruit, vegetable juices 059 0.88 1.39 + 
BLZ BHS Fruit, vegetable juices 059 0.81 1.20 + 
BRB GUY Petroleum products 334 1.45 0.71 - 
DMA VCT Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.59 1.48 * 
DMA LCA Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.31 1.15 * 
DMA KNA Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.29 1.33 + 
DMA JAM Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.12 1.11 * 
DMA GUY Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.90 1.69 * 
DMA GRD Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.49 1.49 * 
DMA BLZ Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.03 1.14 + 
DMA BRB Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.34 1.67 + 
DMA BHS Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.23 1.25 * 
GRD SUR Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 3.02 7.59 + 
GRD VCT Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 0.51 1.02 + 
GRD LCA Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 6.47 9.26 + 
GRD KNA Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 2.87 4.89 + 
GRD GUY Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 0.67 2.33 + 
GRD DMA Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 8.55 13.15 + 
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GRD BHS Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 1.09 2.03 + 
GUY SUR Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.17 0.83 - 
GUY VCT Rice  042 1.18 1.7 + 
GUY VCT Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.39 0.97 - 
GUY JAM Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.21 1.03 * 
GUY JAM Rice  042 0.70 1.06 + 
GUY GRD Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.05 0.95 - 
GUY DMA Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.27 0.88 - 
JAM GUY Petroleum products 334 0.40 1.18 + 
KNA VCT Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.08 0.00 - 
LCA GUY Petroleum products 334 1.22 1.03 + 
TTO SUR Petroleum products  334 1.63 1.08 * 
TTO VCT Petroleum products  334 0.84 1.02 + 
TTO LCA Petroleum products  334 1.16 1.12 * 
TTO JAM Petroleum products  334 1.70 1.31 * 
TTO GUY Petroleum products  334 2.57 1.77 * 
TTO DMA Petroleum products  334 1.07 0.98 - 
TTO BLZ Petroleum products  334 1.47 0.95 - 
TTO BRB Petroleum products  334 1.19 0.65 - 
TTO BHS Petroleum products  334 1.60 1.42 * 
VCT SUR Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 3.80 5.31 + 
VCT LCA Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 8.66 7.16 * 
VCT KNA Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 3.69 3.72 + 
VCT GUY Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 0.59 2.32 + 
VCT DMA Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 10.86 11.06 + 
VCT BHS Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 1.38 1.65 + 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012).  
Notes: * means that trade complementarity has declined but remained above one (1).  
             + means that trade complementarity has improved from below one (1) to above 
one (1). 
             - means that trade complementarity has declined from above one (1) to below 
one (1). 
 
5.4 Extra-CARICOM Trade Complementarity  
 
The level of trade complementarity between 12 CARICOM countries and 60 non-CARICOM 
countries from the EU, North America, Asia, Latin America, Central America, and Africa are 
explored in this section (see Tables 6 and 7).  
 
 
 
 
24 
 
European Union (25) 
 
In the first instance, the level of trade complementarity for CARICOM’s trade with its 25 EU 
trade partners are low since the value of their bilateral trade complementarity index are either 
below or marginally above one (1). Comparatively, the level of trade complementarity between 
CARICOM and the EU countries is lower than intra-CARICOM trade complementarity in 
general. Product complementarity for CARICOM exports to the EU are observed for products 
such as petroleum products (SITC 334) and soap, cleaners and polish (SITC 554). However, a 
general decline is observed for aluminum ore and concentrates (SITC 285).   
 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
 
In relation to the NAFTA market, a low level of trade complementarity is observed between 
CARICOM and NAFTA countries with the exception of Jamaica in relation to Canada and for 
St. Kitts and Nevis in relation to Mexico. There have not been considerable improvements in the 
level of complementarity between CARICOM and NAFTA members over the last decade since 
their trade complementarity indices remain below (1) in most instances.  
 
Latin American Countries 
 
CARICOM’s trade complementarity in relation to Latin American countries originates largely 
from meal and wheat (SITC 046), aluminum ore and concentrates (SITC 285), petroleum 
products (SITC 334), and soap, cleaners and polish (SITC 554) and sugars, molasses and honey 
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(SITC 061) for the period 2001-2005, but declined in the 4 product groups with only the trade 
complementarity index for aluminum ore and concentrates (SITC 285) remaining above one (1).  
 
Central American Countries 
 
The structure of trade complementarity between CARICOM and the Central American countries 
is made up of electric switch, relay and circuit (SITC 772), soap, cleaners and polish (SITC 554) 
and petroleum products (SITC 334). In relation to the African market, trade complementarity is 
dominated by SITC (046, 034, 042 061, 285, 036 and 057) with countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, 
Algeria and Egypt. The Bahamas, Belize, Guyana and Jamaica also reported complementarity 
with Iceland in Crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates (SITC 036) in the case of the 
former 2 and aluminum ore and concentrates (SITC 285) for the latter 2 over the period. Jamaica 
also displays strong complementarity with New Zealand in aluminum ore and concentrates 
(SITC 285).  
 
Asian Countries 
 
Trade complementarity between CARICOM and Asian countries originate from aluminum ore 
and concentrates (SITC 285) and polymers of styrene (SITC 572) with China for the period 
2001-2005 but complementarity in both product groups have declined by 2006-2010 with the 
latter falling below one (1). For Indonesia, CARICOM began the decade (2001-2005) with 
complementarity in 3 product groups namely sugars, molasses and honey (SITC 061), aluminum 
ore and concentrates (SITC 285), and petroleum products (SITC 334). Grenada also reveals 
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significant improvements for meal and wheat (SITC 046) in relation to Indonesia as their trade 
complementarity index value for this product group increased from 1.10 in 2001-2005 to 2.26 for 
the period 2006-2010. Guyana’s complementarity with India and Turkey is dominated by gold 
(SITC 971). With the exception of the Indian market, product complementarity in the other 
market declined below one (1) in the latter period. In the case of Pakistan, product 
complementarity is observed in petroleum products (SITC 334) and spices (SITC 075) but has 
declined in both product groups by 2006-2010. On the other hand, there were significant 
improvements in complementarity between Guyana and St. Vincent and the Grenadines relative 
to the Philippines for rice (SITC 042) over the period 2001-2010 (see Table 7).  
 
The general observation from the extra-regional market is that CARICOM countries have 
complementarity in a wider range of commodities with the non-CARICOM countries in Table 7, 
although this complementarity is concentrated in primary products. Moreover, the results 
indicate that the level of trade complementarity between the CARICOM region and its proposed 
FTA partners is generally low and appears to be weakening (Tables 6 and 7). This situation has 
the potential to hinder the expected benefits from these trade agreements. 
 
Table 6: Trade complementarity indices for CARICOM countries and their trading 
partners (2001-2005 to 2006-2010). 
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European Union (25) 
AUT 
0.74 0.76 1.09 1.17 0.92 0.70 0.48 1.12 1.03 0.10 0.85 0.92 
0.87 0.97 1.09 1.27 0.94 0.96 0.58 0.96 1.02 0.14 0.95 0.99 
BEL 
0.99 1.06 1.23 1.48 0.82 1.23 0.57 0.83 1.22 0.11 1.18 1.23 
1.28 1.25 1.29 1.45 1.00 0.82 0.71 0.56 1.18 0.15 1.27 1.22 
CYP 
1.07 0.78 1.93 2.15 0.95 0.88 0.54 0.79 1.41 0.23 1.45 1.04 
1.72 1.01 1.98 2.26 1.30 0.86 1.25 0.85 2.02 0.45 1.47 1.64 
CZE 
0.73 0.39 1.03 1.22 0.85 0.35 0.42 1.53 0.96 0.09 1.03 0.91 
0.62 0.57 0.93 1.24 0.93 0.40 0.41 1.57 0.90 0.08 0.90 1.06 
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DEU 
0.68 0.67 0.86 1.15 0.82 0.54 0.71 0.93 1.13 0.09 1.00 1.05 
0.74 0.89 0.87 1.07 0.80 0.55 0.66 0.86 0.96 0.10 1.08 0.92 
DNK 
1.38 1.03 1.33 1.37 1.84 0.99 0.50 0.96 1.38 0.14 0.78 1.60 
1.24 1.11 1.40 1.47 2.11 0.94 0.66 1.05 1.48 0.17 0.58 1.70 
ESP 
1.73 1.22 1.05 1.16 1.18 1.09 0.81 0.85 1.04 0.11 1.07 0.92 
1.46 1.36 1.10 1.09 1.29 0.84 0.90 0.85 1.04 0.14 1.24 1.01 
EST 
1.08 0.73 1.64 1.50 2.02 0.93 0.63 1.85 1.46 0.17 1.29 1.33 
1.49 0.84 1.67 1.43 1.65 1.02 1.17 1.48 2.01 0.36 1.46 1.32 
FIN 
0.80 0.57 1.07 1.16 0.72 0.59 0.46 1.18 1.09 0.11 1.16 0.84 
0.76 0.87 1.06 1.10 0.79 0.50 0.69 1.23 1.03 0.14 0.95 0.86 
FRA 
0.95 0.88 1.07 1.44 1.10 0.68 0.79 0.83 1.14 0.11 1.05 1.20 
0.99 1.17 1.17 1.35 1.15 0.65 0.79 0.81 1.10 0.14 1.13 1.14 
GBR 
0.77 0.86 1.10 1.30 0.82 0.86 0.55 0.88 1.37 0.13 0.57 1.13 
0.88 1.13 1.23 1.41 1.00 0.81 0.77 0.94 1.48 0.14 0.72 1.19 
GRC 
1.13 0.80 1.22 1.88 1.33 0.63 0.60 0.55 1.25 0.13 1.35 1.22 
1.20 1.34 1.38 1.64 1.21 0.84 0.90 0.62 1.20 0.18 1.03 1.06 
HUN 
0.60 0.28 0.95 1.09 0.86 0.31 0.36 1.92 0.76 0.07 0.90 0.63 
0.69 0.43 0.87 1.08 0.87 0.38 0.42 1.96 0.75 0.09 1.02 0.81 
IRL 
0.78 0.65 1.23 1.37 1.24 0.67 1.58 1.09 1.07 0.12 0.70 1.16 
1.14 1.16 1.53 1.63 1.50 0.95 1.58 0.89 1.34 0.18 0.92 1.78 
ITA 
1.31 0.82 0.83 1.08 0.65 1.28 0.67 0.80 0.84 0.10 0.73 0.78 
1.18 1.03 0.90 1.03 0.74 0.94 0.61 0.68 0.79 0.09 0.89 0.73 
LTU 
0.89 0.70 1.13 1.86 1.28 0.65 0.40 0.84 1.19 0.10 1.28 1.21 
0.79 1.67 1.17 2.06 1.14 0.70 0.62 0.75 1.38 0.11 1.41 1.61 
LUX 
1.06 0.59 1.51 1.78 0.86 0.42 0.62 0.82 1.72 0.19 1.22 1.41 
1.17 0.69 1.42 1.85 0.99 0.59 1.19 0.85 1.83 0.28 0.94 1.37 
LVA 
1.10 0.76 1.93 2.18 1.62 0.71 0.70 0.94 1.99 0.22 1.57 1.56 
1.23 1.08 1.77 2.02 1.44 0.97 1.00 0.93 2.00 0.26 1.54 1.60 
MLT 
1.21 0.87 1.81 1.72 1.05 1.05 0.52 1.29 1.47 0.18 1.25 1.26 
1.55 0.92 1.72 1.90 1.57 1.19 0.95 0.98 1.58 0.30 0.96 1.45 
NLD 
0.71 0.82 0.96 1.23 1.23 0.52 0.82 0.64 1.14 0.11 1.00 1.27 
0.82 1.12 0.90 1.35 1.32 0.57 0.86 0.81 1.18 0.16 0.87 1.41 
POL 
1.04 0.52 0.97 1.72 1.26 0.44 0.63 0.91 1.11 0.08 1.12 1.23 
1.06 0.86 0.94 1.55 1.24 0.47 0.56 1.03 0.99 0.10 0.66 1.13 
PRT 
1.20 1.10 1.19 1.66 0.99 1.16 0.46 1.03 1.20 0.12 0.92 1.21 
1.18 1.45 1.14 1.65 1.32 0.99 0.53 0.80 1.05 0.11 0.86 1.24 
SVK 
0.63 0.40 0.97 1.19 0.93 0.67 2.33 1.18 0.87 0.09 1.24 0.93 
0.76 0.64 0.95 1.13 1.01 0.69 1.35 1.60 0.90 0.09 1.10 1.14 
SVN 
1.24 0.55 1.28 1.63 0.97 0.93 3.26 1.07 1.10 0.13 1.37 1.19 
1.46 0.68 1.14 1.71 1.17 1.24 3.18 0.78 1.12 0.23 1.13 1.38 
SWE 
0.79 0.54 0.97 1.24 0.98 0.54 0.73 0.93 1.19 0.11 0.84 1.02 
0.95 0.87 0.99 1.22 1.20 0.56 0.69 1.00 1.13 0.15 0.76 1.00 
NAFTA 
CAN 
0.88 0.78 0.94 1.33 0.88 0.97 2.47 0.97 1.10 0.10 0.63 1.01 
0.90 1.15 1.08 1.55 0.95 1.58 2.34 0.95 1.23 0.12 0.63 1.17 
MEX 
0.76 0.26 0.86 0.70 1.05 0.42 0.35 2.04 0.82 0.08 0.73 0.65 
1.00 0.36 0.79 0.71 0.90 0.53 0.54 2.00 0.90 0.17 0.76 0.88 
USA 
0.93 0.66 0.87 0.56 0.86 0.75 0.70 0.73 1.00 0.10 0.97 0.65 
0.95 1.11 1.03 0.60 0.85 0.73 0.76 0.94 1.06 0.12 0.92 0.72 
Latin America  
ARG 
0.73 0.22 0.92 1.71 0.92 0.66 4.56 0.72 0.79 0.07 0.81 0.61 
1.10 0.21 0.72 1.22 0.73 0.73 2.70 1.04 0.68 0.12 0.79 0.53 
BRA 0.85 0.16 1.05 0.87 0.95 0.47 0.41 0.98 0.71 0.16 1.55 0.95 
28 
 
1.08 0.47 0.86 0.72 1.68 0.41 0.60 0.93 0.70 0.17 1.24 1.65 
BOL 
1.00 0.28 2.74 3.07 7.92 0.59 0.48 0.65 1.15 0.18 1.43 9.40 
1.34 0.26 2.06 2.25 18.52 0.81 0.90 0.78 1.27 0.30 1.07 14.77 
COL 
0.70 0.43 1.06 1.46 0.99 0.53 0.52 0.69 0.85 0.13 0.70 0.92 
0.82 0.51 0.89 1.16 0.96 0.57 0.61 0.95 0.81 0.15 0.59 0.97 
ECU 
0.66 0.46 1.42 2.03 1.33 0.42 0.65 0.74 1.06 0.10 1.60 1.03 
1.19 0.39 1.20 1.56 1.63 0.31 0.79 0.84 1.25 0.28 1.87 1.21 
PER 
0.74 0.69 1.51 1.62 1.35 1.05 0.49 1.07 0.94 0.19 1.27 1.03 
1.00 0.79 1.28 1.01 0.93 1.24 0.49 0.85 0.75 0.18 0.67 0.97 
PRY 
1.54 0.25 2.99 2.62 0.91 0.29 0.59 0.57 1.97 0.31 2.50 0.81 
1.27 0.18 1.59 1.45 0.83 0.26 0.93 0.81 1.61 0.32 1.32 0.81 
URY 
1.05 1.11 2.01 2.43 1.02 1.36 0.73 1.39 1.01 0.12 1.23 0.80 
0.92 1.25 1.35 1.78 1.06 0.88 0.77 0.68 0.95 0.19 1.11 0.75 
Central America 
CRI 
0.87 0.51 1.50 1.84 1.20 0.72 0.36 0.89 1.13 0.19 1.16 1.38 
1.09 0.67 1.19 1.46 1.13 0.74 0.63 1.56 1.17 0.27 0.95 1.41 
GTM 
1.13 0.63 2.20 2.37 1.43 0.52 0.51 0.63 1.41 0.24 1.90 1.37 
1.57 0.76 1.58 1.81 1.68 0.66 1.07 0.81 1.43 0.42 1.54 1.90 
HND 
1.59 0.96 2.78 2.56 1.87 1.05 0.64 0.60 1.87 0.41 2.84 2.47 
1.38 1.19 1.86 2.11 1.42 1.14 1.18 0.90 1.84 0.49 1.59 2.09 
SLV 
0.88 0.68 1.43 2.60 1.21 0.53 0.47 0.48 1.28 0.20 1.28 1.83 
1.19 0.98 1.36 2.63 1.32 0.80 0.98 0.80 1.28 0.30 1.40 1.89 
Asia 
CHN 
1.67 0.23 0.55 0.42 0.51 0.59 2.20 1.40 0.47 0.06 0.78 0.37 
1.18 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.42 0.56 1.67 1.41 0.47 0.07 0.82 0.36 
IDN 
1.20 1.11 1.71 1.02 2.09 1.93 2.15 1.27 1.20 0.30 2.46 2.84 
1.56 1.36 1.19 0.93 3.02 1.54 2.06 0.77 1.18 0.36 1.59 2.88 
IND 
0.44 0.32 0.65 0.70 1.29 4.66 0.46 0.47 0.70 0.09 1.79 0.73 
0.52 1.17 0.63 0.63 0.55 3.43 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.10 1.34 0.58 
JPN 
1.54 1.17 0.84 0.74 1.14 1.14 0.51 0.68 0.86 0.10 1.48 0.78 
1.01 1.44 0.86 0.59 0.96 0.78 0.50 0.71 0.72 0.10 1.79 0.65 
PAK 
1.21 0.88 1.68 1.19 2.32 1.86 0.73 0.82 0.98 0.18 2.35 0.92 
1.44 1.48 1.11 1.08 1.19 1.36 1.36 0.87 0.96 0.38 1.77 1.24 
PHL 
0.46 0.23 0.79 0.64 0.71 0.98 0.25 1.24 0.55 0.19 0.77 1.01 
0.68 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.98 3.15 0.52 0.81 0.58 0.44 0.96 2.79 
SGP 
0.85 0.33 1.07 0.66 1.49 0.60 0.33 1.30 0.98 0.14 1.22 0.58 
1.36 0.56 1.00 0.71 0.84 0.63 0.90 1.31 1.18 0.35 1.27 0.63 
THA 
0.97 0.29 0.71 0.75 1.08 1.05 0.40 1.35 0.48 0.05 1.04 0.53 
0.79 0.77 0.71 0.74 1.32 1.31 0.45 1.22 0.54 0.06 1.02 0.85 
Other countries 
AUS 
0.78 0.48 0.98 0.93 0.82 1.28 0.35 0.70 0.87 0.11 0.79 0.56 
0.98 0.72 1.11 0.80 0.82 1.82 0.53 0.89 1.07 0.17 0.83 0.72 
BGR 
0.59 0.81 1.07 1.47 0.89 0.87 0.43 1.12 0.80 0.08 0.60 0.81 
0.78 1.14 1.14 1.32 0.82 0.76 0.53 0.74 0.78 0.12 1.05 0.85 
BLR 
1.03 1.61 1.55 1.12 1.36 1.60 0.71 1.60 0.86 0.12 1.95 1.40 
0.95 1.60 1.08 1.46 1.50 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.98 0.12 2.24 1.29 
CIV 
0.84 0.58 1.96 1.03 3.62 5.66 0.42 0.77 0.66 1.23 1.38 7.26 
0.82 1.30 1.60 0.97 6.55 7.98 0.41 0.63 0.68 0.91 0.95 8.68 
DZA 
0.60 2.13 2.18 1.05 1.16 2.74 0.97 2.82 0.78 0.14 0.64 1.38 
0.73 1.60 1.34 1.01 0.77 2.09 0.66 1.01 0.73 0.11 0.34 1.14 
EGY 
0.91 1.00 1.08 1.03 1.74 2.38 7.99 1.23 0.59 0.10 0.96 1.19 
1.23 1.11 0.93 1.33 1.03 1.90 2.74 0.64 0.60 0.17 1.04 0.87 
HRV 0.82 0.85 1.29 2.00 1.41 0.91 0.69 1.08 1.17 0.11 1.33 1.46 
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0.98 1.26 1.32 2.00 1.43 0.96 0.75 0.84 1.17 0.17 0.95 1.30 
ISR 
0.61 0.65 0.97 0.93 0.58 2.72 0.36 1.14 0.60 0.10 0.80 0.48 
0.84 1.18 0.96 1.03 0.68 1.71 0.50 0.75 0.70 0.13 0.70 0.70 
ISL 
3.14 1.90 1.74 1.55 1.50 3.93 21.87 1.11 1.65 0.20 1.51 1.76 
2.12 1.49 1.48 1.53 1.44 12.71 39.45 0.96 1.61 0.30 0.92 1.71 
RUS 
0.97 2.52 1.90 2.38 1.32 3.60 10.20 2.29 2.08 0.17 0.55 2.11 
0.82 1.70 1.19 2.29 1.28 1.82 4.26 1.10 1.86 0.09 0.25 1.75 
NZL 
1.00 0.90 1.52 1.61 1.11 1.44 5.13 1.02 1.40 0.16 1.02 1.16 
1.08 1.34 1.46 1.66 1.26 1.69 3.88 0.86 1.47 0.22 0.83 1.31 
TUR 
0.99 0.13 0.65 0.69 0.52 1.70 0.33 0.65 0.46 0.09 1.32 0.51 
1.19 0.38 0.70 0.73 0.50 1.11 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.16 1.08 0.54 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
Note: Exporting countries listed in columns. 
 
Table 7: Product complementarity for CARICOM's extra-regional trade (Cij>1 for 
either 2001-2005 to 2006-2010) 
CARICOM Partner Description 
SITC 
code 
01-05 06-10 ∆ 
BHS CHN Polymers of styrene  572 1.23 0.75 - 
BHS HND Petroleum products  334 0.88 1.06 * 
BHS ISL Crustaceans 036 1.91 0.84 - 
BLZ DZA Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.82 1.25 * 
BLZ BLR Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.02 0.25 - 
BLZ ISL Crustaceans 036 1.25 0.65 - 
BLZ RUS Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.54 0.46 - 
BRB HND Petroleum products  334 1.18 0.60 - 
DMA BOL Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.35 1.16 * 
DMA CYP Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 0.92 1.12 + 
DMA SLV Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.28 1.49 + 
DMA GTM Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.13 0.90 - 
DMA HND Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.19 0.97 - 
DMA RUS Fruit and nuts, fresh or dried 057 0.99 1.03 + 
DMA URY Soap, cleaners, polish etc.  554 1.22 0.99 - 
GRD BOL Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 6.81 17.62 + 
GRD BRA Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 0.16 1.16 + 
GRD CIV Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 1.66 4.57 + 
GRD CIV Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 034 1.20 1.52 + 
GRD IDN Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 1.10 2.26 + 
GRD PAK Spices 075 1.77 0.62 - 
GUY DZA Sugars, molasses and honey 061 2.27 1.50 * 
GUY AUS Gold, non-monetary  971 0.88 1.38 + 
GUY BLR Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.26 0.31 - 
GUY CIV Rice  042 4.56 7.37 + 
GUY ISL Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 2.70 11.78 + 
GUY IND Gold, non-monetary  971 3.63 2.95 * 
GUY IDN Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.12 0.89 - 
GUY ISR Pearls and precious stones 667 1.92 0.83 - 
GUY PAK Sugars, molasses and honey 061 0.98 1.00 + 
GUY PHL Rice  042 0.60 2.64 + 
GUY RUS Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 1.26 0.87 - 
GUY RUS Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.90 0.56 - 
GUY TUR Gold, non-monetary  971 1.41 0.78 - 
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GUY URY Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.10 0.63 - 
JAM ARG Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 4.25 2.30 * 
JAM CAN Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 2.14 1.85 * 
JAM CHN Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 1.98 1.31 * 
JAM EGY Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 7.51 2.01 * 
JAM ISL Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 21.31 38.58 + 
JAM IDN Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 1.43 0.90 - 
JAM IRL Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 1.21 0.89 - 
JAM NZL Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 4.62 3.12 * 
JAM RUS Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 9.25 3.74 * 
JAM SVK Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 2.04 0.98 - 
JAM SVN Aluminum ore, conctr. Etc. 285 2.88 2.46 * 
KNA DZA Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.84 0.00 - 
KNA BLR Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.04 0.00 - 
KNA CRI Electric switch, relay, circuit 772 0.52 1.17 + 
KNA HUN Electric switch, relay, circuit 772 1.33 0.89 - 
KNA MEX Electric switch, relay, circuit 772 1.49 1.10 * 
KNA RUS Sugars, molasses and honey 061 1.63 0.00 - 
LCA RUS Fruit and nuts, fresh or dried 057 1.15 0.80 - 
SUR CIV Rice  042 1.13 0.83 - 
TTO BLR Natural gas  343 0.79 1.30 + 
TTO CYP Petroleum products  334 0.88 1.15 + 
TTO GTM Petroleum products  334 1.20 1.08 * 
TTO HND Petroleum products  334 1.98 1.19 * 
TTO IDN Petroleum products  334 1.30 0.97 - 
TTO PAK Petroleum products  334 1.41 1.02 * 
TTO PRY Petroleum products  334 1.70 0.87 - 
VCT BOL Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 8.71 13.87 + 
VCT CIV Rice  042 4.56 5.40 + 
VCT CIV Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 2.05 2.62 + 
VCT IDN Meal, flour of wheat, MSLN  046 1.34 1.76 + 
VCT PHL Rice  042 0.58 1.87 + 
VCT RUS Fruit and nuts, fresh or dried 057 1.27 0.89 - 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012).  
Notes: * means that trade complementarity has declined but remained above one (1).  
             + means that trade complementarity has improved from below one (1) to above 
one (1). 
             - means that trade complementarity has declined from above one (1) to below 
one (1). 
 
5.5 Dominance of Special Country Bias  
 
The results from the trade bias indices are reported in Table 8. The trade bias index account for 
all trade determining factors that are not associated with the comparative advantage 
(disadvantage) profiles of trading partners and is an important component in explaining the 
overall intensity of bilateral trade among countries. The intensity of intra-CARICOM trade is 
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characterized by an extremely high level of trade bias for the majority of the bilateral trade 
relations among member countries. The influence of trade bias has increased significantly in 
relation to the level of trade complementarity over the last two decades (see Table 8). One 
exception is The Bahamas, where the structure of trade bias is lower relative to other members of 
the CARICOM. The largest trade bias among CARICOM countries is associated with the smaller 
countries in the region namely members of the OECS.  
 
Table 8: Trade bias indies for CARICOM countries and their trading partners  
(2001-2005 to 2006-2010) 
  
B
H
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L
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B
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B
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A
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G
U
Y
 
J
A
M
 
K
N
A
 
L
C
A
 
S
U
R
 
T
T
O
 
V
C
T
 
BHS 
  2.4 11.4 3.0 0.7 0.8 7.0 1.4 4.2 2.1 11.4 0.1 
  0.1 16.8 5.2 0.3 1.8 4.3 
 
1.3 0.1 5.8 1.3 
BLZ 
0.4 
 
39.3 116.6 8.4 65.1 76.1 
 
23.0 0.6 10.0 0.1 
3.3 
 
40.4 43.2 1.0 22.4 37.4 22.0 25.3 0.3 8.1 0.8 
BRB 
2.6 29.8 
 
102.4 154.2 122.1 49.2 7.4 309.6 294.3 187.6 340.0 
2.8 26.1 
 
112.1 254.7 152.2 43.0 41.3 304.3 1159.8 297.1 361.3 
DMA 
0.5 11.0 229.4 
 
156.3 63.9 106.3 198.0 1349.7 8.5 98.8 206.2 
1.4 69.8 268.2 
 
516.3 82.9 52.7 469.6 1328.2 6.3 105.3 249.3 
GRD 
1.8 1.5 286.7 92.3 
 
76.9 46.4 20.5 773.6 3.2 219.1 601.9 
0.6 
 
339.4 155.6 
 
82.1 34.4 179.9 547.6 6.4 235.8 1611.7 
GUY 
0.1 42.5 111.4 307.4 87.7 
 
42.5 2.5 67.5 1344.2 93.6 42.2 
0.2 61.2 160.6 239.2 54.4 
 
21.1 6.6 48.8 941.8 108.7 30.8 
JAM 
3.5 49.0 48.7 217.2 19.6 51.9 
 
0.2 5.5 14.3 44.6 30.6 
6.0 25.6 56.6 206.9 26.5 44.6 
 
0.5 10.6 19.8 51.5 20.8 
KNA 
3.3 0.6 299.7 451.6 444.2 35.2 70.0 
 
272.1 
 
118.2 201.3 
6.2 
 
276.3 645.9 497.8 98.9 54.1 
 
200.5 6.5 203.7 386.8 
LCA 
2.1 4.0 298.7 282.6 193.6 71.9 51.9 22.8 
 
2.5 109.1 206.5 
0.3 
 
378.1 260.6 230.3 78.5 28.6 171.0 
 
25.0 104.1 420.6 
SUR 
0.4 2.2 74.9 145.1 4.0 103.6 12.9 
 
10.7 
 
95.3 2.4 
  2.4 63.0 145.8 3.6 93.6 12.0 
 
3.9 
 
151.2 16.8 
TTO 
1.0 69.7 146.5 111.5 56.1 87.1 52.8 19.9 260.8 80.6 
 
116.9 
1.7 24.5 183.5 130.9 64.4 78.7 32.6 19.1 560.1 335.2 
 
214.1 
VCT 
  0.7 373.4 166.5 375.4 64.3 42.2 36.7 789.3 15.6 167.6   
0.2 1.8 466.3 205.3 612.6 59.4 32.6 217.4 681.6 4.6 146.5   
Non-CARICOM countries 
AUS 
0.58 0.01 0.09 
  
0.06 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 
0.32 0.00 0.03 
 
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 
BEL 
0.04 0.01 0.04 
 
1.62 1.36 0.05 
 
0.00 24.03 0.08 0.00 
0.00 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.80 1.23 0.03 
 
0.00 31.34 0.14 0.00 
BRA 
0.20 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.34 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.05 8.37 0.58 0.03 
0.26 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.06 0.07 0.04 3.11 0.70 0.01 
CAN 1.06 0.32 0.72 0.05 0.59 6.51 2.17 0.18 0.11 23.81 0.84 0.12 
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1.80 0.09 0.85 0.03 0.92 5.57 2.00 0.04 0.07 60.18 0.66 0.07 
CHN 
0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.55 0.00 0.06 1.42 0.01 0.03 
0.07 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.14 0.42 0.28 0.00 0.10 1.36 0.04 0.02 
COL 
0.01 0.05 0.13 
 
1.58 1.53 0.84 
 
0.05 0.35 6.70 0.12 
0.00 0.00 0.41 1.51 0.27 1.17 0.32 
 
0.02 0.68 11.90 0.02 
CRI 
0.03 0.16 0.38 0.06 0.10 0.28 0.50 0.02 0.22 0.24 1.08 0.27 
0.04 159.47 0.48 0.04 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.57 0.22 0.13 6.68 
 
DEU 
0.99 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.79 0.14 0.67 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.00 
0.51 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.08 0.01 
DNK 
0.01 0.15 0.08 
 
0.10 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.13 
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.01 
 
ECU 
0.01 
 
0.05 
  
0.83 0.39 
 
0.01 0.28 0.79 0.03 
0.04 
 
0.04 
  
1.31 0.07 
  
0.19 0.38 
 
ESP 
0.56 0.19 0.23 
 
0.09 0.12 0.02 
 
0.00 0.30 0.31 0.00 
0.06 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.02 
 
0.00 0.91 1.41 0.01 
FRA 
1.97 0.03 0.26 1.30 0.74 0.44 0.98 0.03 0.28 0.90 0.81 0.14 
1.11 0.04 0.23 2.04 1.23 0.53 0.96 0.21 0.32 2.69 0.44 0.06 
GBR 
0.95 6.52 2.05 2.77 0.39 3.54 4.21 3.78 4.68 0.21 0.43 4.88 
0.85 4.74 2.03 2.03 0.26 4.42 2.79 0.73 3.05 0.05 0.67 2.75 
GRC 
0.12 0.02 0.09 
  
0.21 0.00 
 
0.01 0.03 0.09 0.00 
0.09 0.06 0.23 
  
0.00 0.01 
 
0.12 0.00 0.19 0.00 
GTM 
0.41 8.31 0.08 0.10 
 
0.07 1.25 
  
0.58 4.21 0.01 
1.17 17.72 0.05 0.06 
 
0.30 0.35 0.04 
 
0.23 1.34 0.00 
HND 
0.30 4.58 0.08 
  
0.17 4.62 0.01 0.98 0.12 5.77 
 0.34 2.00 0.16 
  
0.10 0.69 
 
0.15 0.03 3.30 0.06 
IND 
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.01 0.10 10.13 0.04 
 0.01 0.00 0.27 
 
0.05 0.16 0.03 
 
0.27 0.21 0.19 
 
ITA 
0.10 0.14 0.15 
 
0.04 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.01 
0.02 0.01 0.10 
 
0.07 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.10 
JPN 
0.02 1.81 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.79 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.00 
0.04 0.26 0.01 0.01 1.82 0.19 0.65 0.09 0.01 0.27 0.04 0.01 
MEX 
0.14 3.36 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.19 1.51 0.00 
0.18 3.49 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.04 1.05 0.00 
NLD 
0.02 5.12 0.23 0.00 3.83 1.87 3.09 0.01 0.02 10.54 0.26 0.03 
1.50 1.39 0.11 0.02 1.11 2.66 2.47 0.00 0.04 6.11 0.57 0.01 
PER 
0.03 0.09 0.02 
 
0.01 0.19 0.96 
  
10.54 0.83 
 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 
0.09 0.73 
 
0.52 0.03 1.43 0.00 
SLV 
0.35 1.54 0.16 0.06 
 
0.18 0.23 
 
1.21 0.22 4.28 
 0.40 10.67 0.37 
 
0.01 0.06 0.12 1.05 0.02 0.13 0.72 0.01 
THA 
0.00 0.94 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
 
0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.01 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.00 
USA 
4.52 7.73 1.05 0.62 1.87 1.68 2.23 5.98 0.97 1.17 3.25 0.65 
5.42 2.71 1.51 0.41 1.64 1.54 3.89 6.31 1.52 2.10 4.11 0.46 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
Note: Exporting countries listed in columns. 
 
Similar trends emerge for CARICOM’s extra-regional trade. Specifically, the trade bias indices 
for CARICOM countries in relation to non-CARICOM countries are relatively lower but are 
relatively strong in relation to the intensity of bilateral trade. Most CARICOM countries appear 
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to have high trade biases with extra-regional partners such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
USA and Canada when compared to other countries such as China, Japan, Thailand, Mexico and 
Brazil. The varying levels of trade bias for intra-CARICOM trade versus some extra-CARICOM 
trade relations can be explained by special country effects. In particular, heavy trade bias in the 
regional market may be strongly influenced by geography, regional integration, similar 
preference structure and other historical and socio-political factors. The relatively high trade bias 
with countries such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada and the USA may have been 
influenced by non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements in the form of the Lomé Conventions 
and colonial links in the case of the former, CARIBCAN and the CBI, respectively. These results 
infer that CARICOM’s trade intensity is dominated by trade bias rather than strong trade 
complementarity.  
 
5.6 CARICOM’s Trade Intensity  
 
The structure of trade intensity between two countries is determined by the product of their 
structure of trade complementarity and their structure of trade bias. The results from the trade 
intensity index are reported in Table 9. The results reveal that the value of the trade intensity 
index is significantly over one (1) in the case of bilateral trade among CARICOM countries and 
below one (1) for most of CARICOM’s trade with non-CARICOM countries. This difference 
infers that CARICOM countries enjoy an intensive bilateral trading relationship when compared 
to their trade with non-CARICOM countries. These results are interesting as the value of intra-
CARICOM’s trade is much lower than extra-CARICOM trade. A possible reason for this trend is 
that most CARICOM countries are not large importers compared to their non-CARICOM 
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counterparts, which manifest itself into a relatively high intensive trading relationship even in the 
presence of low intra-CARICOM exports. The value of the bilateral trade intensity index for 
most CARICOM countries has been on the rise with the exception of The Bahamas relative to 
other CARICOM members.  
 
The trade intensity index is only computed for CARICOM countries trade with a few non-
CARICOM countries due to the unavailability of data. In the case of NAFTA countries, Trinidad 
and Tobago, The Bahamas, Belize, Grenada and St. Kitts and Nevis all observed trade intensity 
indices over one (1) with the USA for most of the period. Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname also 
observed a relatively high level of trade intensity with Canada. With the exception of Belize in 
the last 5 years no other CARICOM member reveals an intensive trading relationship with 
Mexico. CARICOM countries also reported an intensive trading relationship with United 
Kingdom throughout the period. On the other hand, Belize, Grenada and Jamaica reported trade 
intensity indices above one (1) with the Netherlands, while Suriname and Guyana reported a 
growing intensity of trade especially in the latter period with Belgium. A relatively high intensity 
of trade for Trinidad and Tobago and Belize in relation to other countries such as Costa Rica, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is observed for the period. In addition, Belize 
is the only CARICOM member to reveal an intensive trading relationship with the latter three. 
Trade intensity indices for CARICOM countries and their other non-CARICOM counterparts are 
consistently below the one (1) for the last two decades. From these results (Table 9) it appears 
that high trade intensity is associated with country pairs that are in geographic proximity, share 
some socio-political history or where there exists some form of preferential trade agreement or 
both in the case of CARICOM.  
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Table 9: Trade intensity indies for CARICOM countries and their trading partners  
(2001-2005 to 2006-2010) 
  BHS BRB BLZ DMA GRD GUY JAM KNA LCA VCT SUR TTO 
BHS 
  36.7 3.6 8.8 1.6 1.0 6.5 1.8 10.8 0.4 0.7 24.8 
  41.9 0.2 15.4 0.9 2.4 7.4 
 
3.5 4.7 0.0 10.5 
BRB 
3.4 
 
44.1 305.4 306.6 229.1 50.4 11.8 654.3 789.7 86.6 284.2 
2.8 
 
54.3 348.5 617.8 354.4 53.8 56.3 853.0 1060.0 266.8 290.2 
BLZ 
0.4 115.1 
 
246.0 9.7 22.3 41.7 
 
36.5 0.1 0.2 20.6 
4.4 104.0 
 
81.0 1.4 11.0 46.8 16.8 54.4 1.0 0.1 13.6 
DMA 
0.9 1040.1 19.5 
 
1653.7 141.8 117.3 389.7 2861.6 2537.4 3.2 205.5 
2.4 886.3 111.0 
 
7783.1 177.1 83.9 625.0 3226.5 3240.0 2.9 166.9 
GRD 
2.1 960.8 4.0 218.7 
 
147.0 38.3 14.3 1071.8 1123.9 1.2 317.5 
0.8 1133.7 0.0 394.0 
 
207.5 44.3 207.1 1174.9 3920.8 2.2 283.9 
GUY 
0.3 361.5 39.3 884.9 168.3 
 
33.1 2.8 121.6 52.6 453.1 298.7 
0.5 371.1 48.7 643.0 204.3 
 
37.2 6.9 103.4 113.6 553.3 242.7 
JAM 
3.4 134.4 85.2 409.6 33.9 122.6 
 
0.3 9.4 60.1 6.1 131.6 
9.5 117.3 56.7 380.7 43.6 113.6 
 
0.5 17.8 47.1 12.0 133.3 
KNA 
3.8 784.2 510.9 1162.3 1009.9 30.1 47.4 
 
384.7 1323.4 0.3 179.6 
5.5 1015.9 2.9 1690.8 3130.3 122.7 52.4 
 
573.1 1858.3 1.5 170.1 
LCA 
2.0 1012.9 437.9 612.4 1136.3 128.7 48.1 101.8 
 
1683.4 0.6 251.1 
2.6 1326.8 1.3 906.5 2130.1 155.7 45.8 137.1 
 
3193.5 11.1 174.4 
VCT 
  1517.6 1.5 501.4 669.8 203.3 41.2 44.2 1300.6 
 
7.0 269.0 
0.2 1558.6 3.6 606.7 1378.9 197.2 51.8 267.1 1496.4 
 
3.0 211.2 
SUR 
0.4 203.3 2.6 187.9 14.6 139.8 9.4 
 
13.5 13.2 
 
190.1 
  126.4 2.7 176.6 30.6 120.8 18.2 
 
6.9 106.6 
 
242.8 
TTO 
0.8 211.9 67.2 121.1 87.4 97.3 25.7 15.2 244.6 216.5 13.6   
1.0 246.4 56.0 174.6 78.5 86.5 22.0 14.8 461.6 311.8 47.2   
Non-CARICOM countries  
AUS 
0.44 0.09 0.01 
  
0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 
0.32 0.04 0.00 
 
0.03 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
BEL 
0.04 0.05 0.02 
 
1.35 1.83 0.03 
 
0.00 0.01 2.57 0.09 
0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.82 1.04 0.03 
 
0.01 0.00 4.40 0.17 
BRA 
0.16 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.33 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.94 0.89 
0.28 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.40 0.88 
CAN 
0.94 0.68 0.10 0.07 0.53 6.25 5.33 0.17 0.12 0.12 2.35 0.52 
1.61 0.93 0.10 0.05 0.88 8.81 4.68 0.04 0.09 0.09 7.29 0.42 
CHN 
0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 1.24 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.01 
0.08 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.59 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.03 
COL 
0.01 0.14 0.02 
 
1.59 0.67 0.44 
 
0.04 0.12 0.04 4.63 
0.00 0.35 0.00 1.60 0.25 0.62 0.19 
 
0.01 0.02 0.09 6.98 
CRI 
0.02 0.59 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.24 0.40 0.05 1.25 
0.04 0.50 109.18 0.07 0.48 0.10 0.25 0.89 0.25 
 
0.04 6.24 
DEU 
0.66 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.65 0.08 0.47 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.02 
0.37 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.22 0.28 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 
DNK 
0.02 0.11 0.22 
 
0.20 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.00 
 
0.01 0.14 
0.01 0.07 0.03 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 
ECU 
0.01 0.07 
   
0.33 0.23 
 
0.01 0.03 0.03 1.10 
0.05 0.05 
   
0.42 0.06 
   
0.09 0.68 
ESP 
0.95 0.25 0.16 
 
0.11 0.14 0.02 
 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.34 
0.09 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.02 
 
0.01 0.01 0.10 1.76 
FRA 
1.89 0.28 0.03 1.87 0.83 0.30 0.77 0.03 0.32 0.16 0.10 0.85 
1.10 0.27 0.05 2.72 1.35 0.34 0.74 0.17 0.35 0.07 0.38 0.49 
GBR 
0.73 2.25 3.90 3.59 0.32 3.01 2.22 3.43 6.43 5.59 0.03 0.24 
0.73 2.56 5.41 2.86 0.26 3.58 2.13 0.69 4.54 3.29 0.01 0.51 
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GRC 
0.14 0.11 0.03 
  
0.13 0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 
0.11 0.30 0.08 
  
0.00 0.01 
 
0.14 0.01 0.00 0.21 
GTM 
0.49 0.18 4.42 0.29 
 
0.04 0.63 
  
0.01 0.13 8.32 
1.80 0.06 13.69 0.14 
 
0.20 0.37 0.04 
 
0.00 0.08 2.10 
HND 
0.50 0.27 5.81 
  
0.19 2.67 0.01 1.68 
 
0.04 16.52 
0.59 0.26 2.13 
  
0.13 0.82 
 
0.30 0.11 0.02 5.11 
IND 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.53 0.09 0.00 0.06 
 
0.90 0.08 
0.01 0.13 0.00 
 
0.03 0.48 0.02 
 
0.14 
 
0.02 0.24 
ITA 
0.12 0.12 0.07 
 
0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 
0.03 0.09 0.01 
 
0.05 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.05 
JPN 
0.02 0.01 0.68 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.41 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.11 
0.04 0.01 0.37 0.00 1.80 0.15 0.33 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 
MEX 
0.11 0.04 0.81 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 1.08 
0.19 0.07 1.24 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.82 
NLD 
0.02 0.21 1.66 0.01 4.75 0.97 2.57 0.01 0.02 0.04 1.12 0.26 
1.24 0.10 1.55 0.03 1.42 1.48 2.10 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.99 0.46 
PER 
0.03 0.04 0.08 
 
0.01 0.20 0.46 
   
2.01 1.09 
0.16 0.03 0.00 0.00 
 
0.13 0.31 
 
0.26 0.00 0.00 0.43 
SLV 
0.33 0.21 1.14 0.16 
 
0.10 0.11 
 
1.42 
 
0.04 5.64 
0.47 0.51 9.99 
 
0.02 0.05 0.12 0.77 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.03 
THA 
0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 
0.00 0.03 
 
0.01 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 
USA 
4.18 0.91 2.91 0.35 1.60 1.25 1.56 4.38 0.96 0.41 0.11 3.18 
5.15 1.56 3.03 0.25 1.37 1.11 2.99 5.91 1.58 0.33 0.26 3.75 
Source: Own calculations from UN Comtrade (2012). 
Note: Exporting countries listed in columns. 
 
5.7 Reasons for Low Trade Complementarity and Implications  
 
These results have implications for the ongoing debate about the economic benefits associated 
with deeper CARICOM integration and extra-CARICOM FTAs. One of the principal reasons 
cited for the establishment of the CARICOM is that regional integration would have laid the 
foundation for the growth in trade among CARICOM members. However, a prerequisite for 
expanding trade among CARICOM countries’ given their small size is a strong element of 
industrial linkages and product fragmentation across CARICOM economies; this would have 
engineered a higher level of trade complementarity and higher intra-CARICOM trade. Yet, there 
is no evidence that this development occurred based on the trade complementarity analysis. In 
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fact, the trade complementarity indices indicate that trade complementarity for manufactured and 
high value added products are non-existent among CARICOM countries.  
 
Additionally, the trade complementarity index indicates that the level of trade structure 
convergence between the CARICOM region and its proposed FTA partners is low and appears to 
be weakening over time. One would have expected that trade structures between CARICOM 
countries and countries in the EU, Canada and the USA would have converged based on the duty 
free access that the CARICOM countries have received in the latter economies. CARICOM 
firms obtaining access to develop markets should have increased their competitiveness through 
economies of scale benefits on account of a larger export market and other productivity 
spillovers. Clearly convergence in trade structures along the lines of trade complementarity and 
the natural trading partner hypothesis did not occur. These results infer that the non-reciprocal 
trade preferences offered to CARICOM may have acted as a stumbling block to CARICOM 
countries engagement in the multilateral trading system in diverse products (see Bjørnskov and 
Krivonos 2001 for details on CARICOM’s non-reciprocal trade preferences with the EU). 
Consequently, other countries (other supply sources) are relatively more efficient suppliers of 
similar products than CARICOM countries to their proposed FTA partners, implying that 
CARICOM products are more likely to be displaced when preferential access are removed. 
There are several possible factors that can explain why trade complementarity and intra-regional 
trade among CARICOM economies have remained low, some of these include: 
 
1. Market integration: Regional integration among CARICOM economies focused mainly on 
widening the market by reducing trade barriers to facilitate the expansion of intra-regional 
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trade. However, most of the productive structures in the region are not developed to take 
advantage of the commercial opportunities that a relatively larger protected market provides. 
This type of ‘shallow’ integration may have played a role in limiting the development of 
complementarity in trade and production for high value added sectors.      
 
2. Historical trade patterns and non-reciprocal trade preferences: The trade preferences that 
permitted CARICOM economies exports to developed countries may have also reinforced an 
agrarian/low value added type of production in the CARICOM region. In fact, many of these 
non-reciprocal trade agreements provided duty free market access for exports of raw 
materials and agricultural products from CARICOM economies. It is possible that these non-
reciprocal trade preferences from developed countries would have dominated the policy 
space of CARICOM economies, with little attention on developing stronger south-south 
relations where trade complementarity is stronger. 
 
3. Product fragmentation: The inability of many CARICOM countries to develop capital 
intensive technologically driven industries could have contributed to a regional production 
structure that has little product fragmentation across countries. The failure of CARICOM 
economies to exploit complementarities in natural resources and agricultural products would 
have hindered the expansion of industrial linkages in the region and weakened the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing base.  
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4. Smallness: The relatively small size of the CARICOM markets is a limiting factor to firms 
which would otherwise benefit from the productivity gains associated with trading in a large 
protected market in the early stages of their development.  
 
5. Foreign Direct Investment: Multinational Corporations investing in the CARICOM region 
focused mainly on extracting minerals for exports to non-CARICOM economies. This would 
have also stymied the development of trade complementarity in the manufacturing sector, 
thus leading to low levels of intra-CARICOM trade.  
 
6. Capital and knowledge: The lack of capital, knowledge and expertise by CARICOM firms to 
transform raw materials and agricultural products into value added products would have also 
restricted the growth in the agro-processing sector contributing to low levels of trade 
complementarity in this sector. 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Efficient resource utilization requires that economies export those commodities intensive in the 
use of their abundant factors of production and import those commodities that call for factor 
proportions in the opposite direction. In this regard and following the material developed in this 
paper, trade complementarity emerged as the cornerstone theoretical argument for determining 
the real natural trading partner of an economy. The results from the application of the trade 
intensity index model revealed some empirical insights into the determinants of CARICOM’s 
bilateral trade intensity and moreso the need for the region to develop greater complementary or 
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“natural” trading relationships in the intra-regional and extra-regional markets, especially with its 
FTA and proposed FTA partners.  
 
Despite the generally low levels of trade complementarity, several important issues relating to 
CARICOM member’s natural trading partners have been identified. In particular, Central 
America is identified as the most natural trade bloc for the CARICOM region as a whole as well 
as for the OECS bloc and the MDC bloc. Apart from Central America, the OECS and the MDC 
do not share the same natural trading partners. The MDCs have a relatively high level of trade 
complementarity with Asia and the emerging economies when compared to the OECS countries. 
It is important to note that the CARICOM bloc recorded a low level of trade complementarity 
with both NAFTA and the EU. These results indicate that CARICOM countries should be 
engaging in initiatives to strengthen its South-South trade alliances to exploit potential trade 
complementarities with Central America and Asia. Further research should consider the 
expansion of CARICOM to include countries from Central America and Latin America.   
 
In terms of the CARICOM bloc, this paper also established that CARICOM economies are 
“weak” natural trading partners. This categorization is determined by the value of the trade 
complementarity index and the number of commodities for which CARICOM countries have 
trade complementarity. A similar classification can be made for CARICOM and some of its 
extra-regional FTA partners. This classification is supported by the results from the trade 
intensity index model, which shows that complementarity is dominated by a few primary 
products and is on the decline in most areas.  
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The results also revealed that trade complementarity for manufactured products in the 
CARICOM region did not improve. Several factors may be responsible for this trend such as, the 
inability of many CARICOM countries to develop capital intensive technologically driven 
industries, the small size of the CARICOM market, historical trade linkages with Europe and 
North America.  
 
The level of special country bias is comparatively higher implying that the facilitating conditions 
for the expansion of trade among CARICOM members and with some non-CARICOM members 
may be present. However, the lack of comparative advantage in diverse product groups presents 
a major challenge in boosting intra-CARICOM trade potential. This argument is supported by 
the empirical evidence outlined in this paper which shows that complementarity at the product 
level has not changed in the past decade. Furthermore, the paper identified some stylized facts 
about the structure of CARICOM’s trade: 
 
i. Trade intensity among CARICOM countries is stronger than trade intensity between 
CARICOM and the majority of non-CARICOM countries.  
ii. Trade bias dominates the structure of CARICOM’s trade intensity.  
iii. Product complementarity is concentrated in a few product groups for the most part.  
iv. Product complementarity with CARICOM’s FTAs and proposed FTA partners is low 
(with marginal improvements), non-existent or declining in most cases.     
 
Given that the concentration of complementarity is in the primary and natural resource intensive 
sectors, then the promotion of production driven networks are more important than market driven 
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integration strategies. The focus on market-driven integration in the absence of strong trade 
complementarity in the past can provide a possible explanation for the low growth of intra-
regional trade and low manufacturing exports in the CARICOM region. Additionally, with 
CARICOM’s active extra-regional trade agenda in recent times, these facts can serve well to 
influence strategies to improve trade in terms of streamlining policy initiatives to take advantage 
of opportunities associated with trade liberalization.  
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